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Note
In Re Seagate: One Step Closer to a Rational Doctrine
Justin McCarthy∗
Seagate Technology defended itself in a patent suit against
charges that it willfully violated the plaintiff’s patent by raising
an opinion of counsel defense.1 As a result, the trial court
issued a discovery order that permitted discovery of
communications and work-product that applied not only to the
outside counsel that issued the opinion but also to trial
counsel.2 Seagate sought and was granted a writ of mandamus
from the Federal Circuit to prohibit enforcement of the order.3
In granting the writ, an en-banc Federal Circuit in Seagate
overturned the standard of care required for potential patent
infringers to avoid punitive damages first announced in
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.4 At the same
time, the Federal Circuit limited the ability of opposing counsel
to obtain privileged attorney-client communications with an
accused infringer’s trial counsel through discovery due to an
advice of counsel defense asserted in response to a charge of
willful infringement.5
© 2009 Justin McCarthy.
∗
Justin McCarthy is a candidate for J.D. at the University of Minnesota.
Justin wishes to thank his wife Jessa and daughter Grace for all their love and
support. Thank you also to all the staff and editors of MJLST, volume
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1. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en
banc).
2. Id. at 1366–67.
3. Id. at 1376.
4. Id. at 1365 (citing Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
5. See id. at 1365, 1374–75. An advice of counsel defense, or a patent
opinion, allows a company to defend against charges of willful infringement by
submitting the patent at issue and the accused product at issue to a
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Seagate raises a number of important issues pertinent to
patent litigation. While the Federal Circuit changed the
standard for willful infringement, it declined to decide which
factors would be used in determining willful infringement.6
The consequences of this ruling are great, as a recent study
found that 92.3 percent of all patent infringement lawsuits
include allegations of willfulness.7 Furthermore, damages for
such findings can be in the tens of millions of dollars.8
Knowing what evidence a court is likely to consider important
in determining whether the infringement was willful will be
important both to plaintiffs, when they decide whether to
pursue willfulness charges, and to defendants when they are
preparing their defense. Additionally, knowing more about the
legal landscape of willfulness will help companies structure
their conduct to avoid the dreaded and costly “willful infringer”
finding. Finally, the Seagate ruling will have consequences on
pre-trial strategy9 and discovery.10
supposedly independent patent attorney for a written opinion as to whether or
not the accused device infringes and whether or not the patent at issue is
valid. Patent opinions may also be used before there is a problem as a legal
opinion that a particular device or system does not infringe any other patent.
See David V. Radack, Understanding Patent Infringement Legal Opinions,
JOM,
November
1995
at
54
available
at
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9512.html
(last
visited 12/12/2008).
6. Id. at 1371 (“We leave it to future cases to further develop the
application of this standard.”).
7. Matthew Leary, Adverse To What?: The Increasing Value of Patent
Opinions After Knorr-Bremse, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 273 (2007)
(citing a study by Federal Circuit Judge Kimberly A. Moore).
8. See id. at 274 (discussing a 1991 verdict of $53 million for 3M for
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedic, Inc.’s willful infringement and a 2001 award
of $85 million in enhanced damages to Boston Scientific for Medtronic’s willful
infringement).
9. Cf. Felicia J. Boyd et al., Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., In Seagate
Decision, Federal Circuit Raises Standard for Willfulness in Patent
Infringement
Suits
(2007),
http://www.faegre.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=2819 (discussing briefly the
potential effects of the Seagate decision on litigation strategy).
10. Id.:
With respect to the scope of waiver, In re Seagate makes a clear
distinction between “opinion counsel” and “trial counsel.”
Additionally, it continues to afford trial courts the discretion to
expand the waiver of privilege to trial counsel, for example, in
situations where the parties or counsel engage in “chicanery.” This
analysis assumes that “trial counsel” and “opinion counsel” can be
readily distinguished and leaves unclear the types of conduct that
would constitute chicanery. Thus, it may be wise to continue the
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This Comment both provides a critique of the Seagate
decision and offers some guidance on the types of factors that a
court will likely consider when determining willful
infringement. This Comment first details the relevant patent
and other intellectual property law that predated the Seagate
decision. Next, this Comment summarizes Seagate in more
detail, describes the potential weaknesses in the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning, and provides some insight as to which
factors the court will likely use in determining the willfulness
of patent infringement. To do this, this Comment relies on
other areas of intellectual property law and the conceptions of
willfulness found in those areas. Finally, this Comment
concludes that while the Federal Circuit left the factors that
will be important in this new regime open for later cases, some
hints can be divined from Seagate itself and from related areas
of law.
I. BACKGROUND OF PATENTS GENERALLY AND OF
“WILLFULNESS” IN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW
A. PATENTS GENERALLY AND THE HISTORY OF WILLFUL
INFRINGEMENT
The Constitution authorizes Congress “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”11 To accomplish this
task, Congress created the first U.S. patent statute in 1790,
shortly after the passage of the Constitution.12 A patent
confers upon an inventor the exclusive privilege to make, use,
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention for a limited time.13
This privilege has often been called a state-granted monopoly.14
The purpose of granting a patent is to give incentives to
practice of keeping the identity and activities of trial counsel distinct
and separate from that of opinion counsel.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Prior to the Constitution, individual states
often created their own patent systems. This was thought to be ineffective
and, thus, provision for federal patent law was made one of the enumerated
powers of Congress when the Constitution was adopted. See Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964).
12. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERAL DUFFY, PATENT LAW
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 8 (4th ed. 2007) (citing the Patent Act of
1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (Apr. 10, 1790)).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
14. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 229.
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inventors who invent new and useful things and to encourage
public disclosure of those inventions.15 Currently, patent
protection is limited to twenty years from the effective date of
filing.16
In order to be granted a patent, an invention must meet
The first requirement is that only
certain criteria.17
“process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or composition[s] of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” qualify as
patentable subject matter.18 Next, patent law requires that an
invention be novel19 and possess some useful purpose.20 Patent
law also rejects inventions that are obvious variations of
existing inventions.21 Finally, the patent application must
meet certain additional requirements, such as enabling a
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention, specifying the “best mode” of practicing the
invention, and having proper claim term definiteness.22 A
patent is issued if these requirements are satisfied.23
A modern issued patent has many features, the most
15. Id.; see Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
17. See id. § 101.
18. Id. The presumption is that anything is patentable except laws of
nature, abstract ideas, and physical phenomenon.
See Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 33 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse 56 U.S. 62,
112–121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853)). Compare
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303 (holding that a man-made oil eating bacteria is
patentable), with O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 62–63 (holding that a claim to all
methods of communicating at a distance using electricity is an abstract idea
and not patentable).
19. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (describing the conditions for
patentability, novelty, and loss of right to patent).
20. Id. § 101; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1966)
(“Our starting point is the proposition, neither disputed nor disputable, that
one may patent only that which is ‘useful.’”).
21. 35 U.S.C § 103(a) (2000):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.
22. See id. § 112.
23. Id. § 101.
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important of which is the “claims” section.24 The claims section
is “the portion of the patent document that defines the scope of
the patentee’s rights . . . .”25 Note however, that “the claims
must be supported by the disclosure in the rest of the patent
specification.”26
Congress has created a cause of action against violation, or
“infringement,” of the exclusive rights granted to an inventor
who holds a patent.27 An infringement occurs when someone
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention . . . .”28 The patent’s claims retain primary
importance when determining whether infringement has
occurred, although the claim specification also plays an
important role in the “claim construction” portion of the trial.29
Infringement is currently a strict liability offense, meaning
intent to infringe or lack thereof has no legal significance.30
Consequently, under the current state of the law, an
independent inventor who has no knowledge of the existence of
the patented invention (or of the patent for that matter) is still
liable for infringement.
If the accused infringer is found guilty of infringement by a
court, she may be enjoined from further infringement31 and
assessed “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for
the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”32
Congress has also authorized the awarding of so-called

24. Every patent must include at least one claim. See id. § 112, ¶ 2.
25. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996);
“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 212 (2000).
26. Merges & Duffy, supra note 12, at 26.
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil
action for infringement of his patent.”).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
29. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 569–71 (1876); see also Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). In patent
litigation, if there is any dispute as to what the patent at issue means or
covers, a “claim construction” or “Markman” hearing is held where the judge
decides the issue as a matter of law; see generally Markman, 517 U.S. 370.
30. Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of
the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 56–57
(2001).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
32. Id. § 284.
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“triple damages” by discretion of the court.33 The statute
makes no mention of what constitutes grounds for the
awarding of increased damages.34 Traditionally courts have
used the triple damages provision only where the infringer
deliberately copied the patented technology.35 Recently, courts
have expanded this provision to apply to cases “against
infringers who independently developed their own technology,
without
appropriating
ideas
from
the
patentee.”36
Understanding why courts first imposed the deliberate
infringement standard and why they later expanded the reach
of the applicable cases where triple damages are imposed (and
what that expansion included) requires a brief look at the
history and language of the patent laws.37
The Patent Act of 1790 provided that the Secretary of
State, the Secretary for the Department of War, and the
Attorney General would evaluate patent applications to
determine whether they were worthy of a patent.38 The act
further specified that infringers were liable for monetary
damages determined by a jury. 39 Congress modified the act in
the Patent Act of 1793, making two important changes. First,
the patent duties held by the Secretary of State, Secretary for
the Department of War, and Attorney General were reduced to
ministerial duties.40 Patents were no longer reviewed to
determine whether they were worthy of a patent; instead,
patents were granted for any invention which met very lenient
standards, effectively turning the patent system into a
registration system.41 The second important change arose from
33. Id. (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.”).
34. See id.
35. Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 55.
36. Id.
37. See generally Powers & Carlson, supra note 30 for a more thorough
look at the history of the Patent Act of 1793 and the evolution of the doctrine
of willful patent infringement.
38. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10 (1790).
39. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. at 111.
40. Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 62.
41. See id; see generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 12, at 8–9:
But while the patent system got on its feet under Jefferson, it did not
grow to its full stature until the 1836 revision, when a formal system
of examination, with professional examiners, was substituted for the
pro forma registration system of the 1793 Act, a system which had
itself been substituted for the original (1790) procedure under which
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Congress’ fear that patent rights were not adequately respected
throughout the country. Congress feared jury nullification,
whereby a jury that disliked patents could award nominal
damages to patent holders whose patents had been infringed.42
Probably as a result of this fear, the Patent Act of 1793
contained a provision that mandated a jury award of triple the
price of the patentee’s invention.43
The Patent Act of 1836 changed the damages from
mandatory triple damages to a maximum of triple damages
based on the discretion of the court.44 Congress made this
change to protect good-faith infringers who had legitimately
discovered the patented invention independently and were
being hurt by the triple damages provision.45 Congress was
also likely worried about unscrupulous individuals taking
advantage of the relative ease of obtaining a patent under the
pro-forma registration system and obtaining patents on
inventions they did not invent, and then obtaining large
verdicts against real innovators.46 The judicial doctrine of
awarding of triple damages only for situations in which the
defendant deliberately infringed the patent sprang out of this
reasoning.47 This doctrine remained the law until Underwater
Devices expanded its application in 1983.48
In Underwater Devices, Spencer Robley had patented a
patentability was determined by three high-level government officials
(including Jefferson as Secretary of State).
42. At least one historian credits this fear to a pamphlet published by a
patent agent named Joseph Barnes, in which he “criticized the ‘indeterminate
principle upon which patents are granted,’ as well as the limitation of
damages for infringement to those assessed by a jury.” Powers & Carlson,
supra note 30, at 61–62. Barnes was the patent agent of an aggrieved
inventor. Id. at 61.
43. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11 § 5, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (“[E]very person so
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least
equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or
licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention . . . .”).
44. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (1836) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)).
45. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 67–68.
46. Id.
47. See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488–89 (1853); Powers &
Carlson supra note 30, at 69–70 (“Courts justified imposing treble damages as
a means to punish the misappropriation of patented technology. Courts also
used the treble damages provision as a way to punish bad faith business
tactics in the context of patent licensing agreements.”).
48. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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method for laying pipe underwater.49 When Morrison-Knudsen
Co. was bidding to build an underwater sewer in Hawaii, the
owner of Robley’s patent contacted Morrison-Knudsen with an
offer to license the patent for the project.50 Morrison-Knudsen
commenced operations on its independently derived (yet
infringing) method after receiving only an initial cursory
opinion of the invalidity of the Robley patent from its general
counsel.51 Morrison-Knudsen later obtained a more thorough
opinion regarding the patent after it had already begun laying
pipe.52 Building on prior cases,53 the court held that once “a
potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights,
he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing.”54 This standard applies
regardless of whether the accused infringer intended to
infringe.55 The court rejected Morrison-Knudsen’s defense of
good-faith reliance on counsel because the opinion was biased,
for it was given by in-house counsel and was only a cursory
examination.56
Under the Federal Circuit jurisprudence following the
Underwater Devices standard,
[T]he general test for whether a patentee is entitled to increased
damages is whether, in view of the totality of the circumstances, the
patentee shows by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted in disregard of the patent and lacked a reasonable basis for
believing it had a right to do so.57

A court could consider several factors in determining
49. Id. at 1382.
50. Id. at 1384.
51. Id. at 1385.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1389–90 (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc.,
623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc, 415 F.2d
1068 (6th Cir. 1969); Marvel Specialty Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc., 386 F.2d
287 (4th Cir. 1967)).
54. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389.
55. See id. at 1390.
56. Id. at 1390.
57. Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 82; see also Vulcan Eng’g Co. v.
Fata Aluminium, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002):
[T]he focus is generally on whether the infringer exercised due care to
avoid infringement, usually by seeking the advice of competent and
objective counsel, and receiving exculpatory advice. When it is found
that the infringer acted without a reasonable belief that its actions
would avoid infringement, the patentee has established willful
infringement, which may be accompanied by enhanced damages.
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whether conduct was willful and the plaintiff was entitled to
triple damages:
(1) Whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of
another;
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a goodfaith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed;
(3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation.
....
(4) Defendant’s size and financial condition.
(5) Closeness of the case.
(6) Duration of the defendant’s misconduct.
(7) Remedial action by the defendant.
(8) Defendant’s motivation for harm.
(9) Whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.58

In the absence of evidence of actual, deliberate copying, the
court permits evidence in its consideration of factors two
through nine that would allow the court to infer that
willfulness occurred (essentially relying on circumstantial
evidence), either in infringing initially or infringing after the
party was notified that its process or product potentially
infringed.
The problem with the second factor is that a defendant
must have a “good-faith” belief, so this factor often “turn[s] on
the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the infringement.”59
State of mind is entirely subjective, and a defendant must
somehow prove his state of mind.60 An opinion of counsel that
is adequate and relied upon can be evidence of that state of
mind.61 Thus one common way for a firm to avoid liability is to
utilize factor number two and obtain a competent written
opinion by counsel upon receiving notice that a product or
device potentially infringes.62 Courts evaluating this defense
would look into the adequacy of the opinion, considering such
factors as the “nature of the advice, the thoroughness and
58. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827 (citations omitted).
59. Joshua Stowell, Comment, Willful Infringement and the Evidentiary
Value of Opinion Letters After Knorr-Bremse v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV.
5,
¶
29,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0005.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Douglas Y’Barbo, Written Opinions from Counsel, 29 AIPLA Q.J.
65, 70–71 (2001).
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competence of the legal opinion presented, and its objectivity.
The court will determine whether the advice of noninfringement or invalidity or unenforceability could have
reasonably been relied on . . . .”63
One problem with utilizing this approach is that a court
scrutinizes the opinion to determine whether the defendant
should have reasonably relied upon the advice given.64
Frequently this entails detailed and much criticized forays into
minutia of patent opinions of which non-lawyers would likely
This creates problems for infringement
not be aware.65
defendants and sets up a series of catch-22 situations. If the
company obtains two opinions, it might be deemed to be
engaged in opinion shopping.66 If the opinion is too short, it is
arguably incompetent; if it is too long, the court may suspect
that it is designed to avoid willfulness findings.67
In later decisions, the Federal Circuit adopted an “adverse
63. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
64. Y’Barbo, supra note 62, at 67. The author writes:
[S]hould the lawyer’s written opinion turn out to be anything less
than an exhaustive recitation on every issue of even the remotest
relevance, the opinion may no longer serve as a defense to willful
infringement. For example, if counsel omits a doctrine of equivalents
analysis, omits an objective factors analysis, fails to base a validity
analysis on un-cited prior art, omits any other of patent law’s hypertechnical minutiae that relates to infringement, validity, or
enforceability, regardless of whether it influences the opinion’s
conclusion, the firm pays for those failure of omissions in a potentially
big way. In addition, the purely technical quality of a legal document
is somehow supposed to be probative of the reader’s state of mind.
This is a strange end result considering that the reader is almost
always unqualified to assess the technical merit of such a document.
Yet that is exactly what the law requires from a law firm in order to
insulate itself against a charge of willful infringement: it must
critically evaluate its lawyer’s advice rather than point to a good faith
basis for having relied upon it.
Id.
65. See id.
66. I.e., the defendant may be getting multiple opinions for the purpose of
finding one that is more favorable to its position. Id. at 99–100.
67. See id. at 101:
One might also imagine a dispute over the thoroughness of an
opinion. The infringer urges that because his opinion considered
every remotely plausible issue, there is clear evidence of his intent to
avoid infringement. On the other hand, the plaintiff argues that the
one hundred-page opinion was in fact strategically designed to avoid
enhanced damages, rather than provide the infringer with
straightforward information about whether it can sell its product.
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inference” against infringers who, knowing that they were
potentially infringing a patent, failed to seek an opinion from
outside counsel.68
B. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ISSUE IN WILLFULNESS
INFRINGEMENT
The attorney-client privilege protects communications
between an attorney and his client from disclosure and possible
use against the client during a trial or other proceeding.69 The
“privilege ‘is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.’”70
This privilege can be waived by the client.71
Several court decisions have held that when an accused
patent infringer relies on the advice of counsel defense, such a
defense constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.72
This waiver extends to all communications relating to the
subject matter of the opinion.73 Some cases have extended this
waiver to communications between trial counsel and the
accused infringer, finding the communications between the two
all bear on the mental state of the infringer (i.e., whether the
alleged infringer reasonably relied upon the opinion), which is
68. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 79–82; Fromson v. W. Litho
Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This negative
inference was overruled prior to Seagate in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of counsel shall no longer
provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion
would have been unfavorable.”). Despite this ruling, many commentators
noted that the real effect of this ruling was minimal at best.”). See, e.g., Debra
Koker, Fulfilling the “Due Care” Requirement after Knorr-Bremse, 11 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 154, 162 (2005). See infra note 77 for a more thorough
discussion.
69. See Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
70. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888)).
71. U.S. v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) (“Any disclosure
inconsistent with maintaining the confidential nature of the attorney-client
relationship waives the attorney-client privilege. Any voluntary disclosure by
the client to a third party waives the privilege not only as to the specific
communication disclosed, but often as to all other communications relating to
the same subject matter.”).
72. See In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
73. Id.
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relevant in determining whether the infringement is willful.74
This was the ruling of the district court that was eventually
overturned in Seagate.75
Commentators have often criticized this waiver theory on
the grounds that allowing the jury to hear potentially
damaging statements regarding an accused infringer’s
assessment of the situation could potentially prejudice the
jury’s determination of actual infringement.76
Thus, infringement defendants often were forced to choose
between disclosure of potentially prejudicial information or
withhold the information and risk exposure to triple damages.77
C. THE ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT RULE AND WILLFULNESS
INFRINGEMENT
The Supreme Court, in the watershed case of Hickman v.
Taylor, held that production of “written statements and mental
impressions contained in the files and the mind of the
attorney”78 are protected from discovery unless the party
seeking production shows substantial need and/or hardship. 79
74. See Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 92 & n.287 (stating the
position and providing several district court opinions extending the scope to
trial counsel).
75. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
76. See, e.g., Powers & Carlson, supra note 30, at 91–92.
77. M. Curt Lambert, Note, Knorr-Bremse’s Elimination of Adverse
Inferences: A First Step in Willful Infringement Litigation Reform, 32 N. KY. L.
REV. 589, 605 (2005) (noting the burdens facing litigants under the “adverse
inference” rule). Note that while Knorr-Bremse did remove the adverse
inference rule from consideration, it retained the duty of care. Many
commentators argued that this did not remove the difficult choice a patent
litigant was faced with since the only way to show due care was to produce a
patent opinion. Id. at 609–10 (“Thus, while the trier of fact can no longer infer
that legal advice would have been unfavorable when the infringer failed to
obtain it, the trier of fact can still consider this failure when deciding if a good
faith belief of invalidity or non-infringement was formed.”); see also Koker,
supra note 68, at 162:
Arguably, telling a jury that an infringer did not bother to obtain a
patent opinion when he could and should have is very similar to an
adverse inference. Likewise, telling a jury that an infringer obtained
a patent opinion and is choosing not to disclose it will likely create an
adverse inference in their minds.
Leary, supra note 7, at 294 (“Even for cases decided after Knorr-Bremse,
district courts have been almost unanimous in allowing evidence of
defendants’ failures to obtain opinions.”).
78. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
79. See id. at 511; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“[A] party may obtain
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In the willful infringement context, courts are split over
whether the advice of counsel defense allows the opposing party
to obtain discovery of the opinion counsel’s attorney workproduct.80 The theory for allowing it is that it is relevant for
purposes of attacking the opposing party’s reasonableness for
relying upon the defense.81 However, this presents the same
tough choices for patent infringement defendants that the
aforementioned attorney-client privilege waivers present.
D. AN EXAMINATION OF WILLFULNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
An examination of copyright law is relevant as a point of
comparison as copyright law also contains a provision for
increased damages for willful violations,82 and the Seagate
court relied heavily on this definition of “willful.”83 Copyright
cases have a threshold requirement, similar to patent cases,84
to show willfulness once the defendant has been put on notice
of his or her potentially infringing conduct: “Proof that a
warning of infringement was received and disregarded is
essential to show willful infringement.”85 Copyright cases hold
that the standard for judging willfulness is recklessness.86
discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under
subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for that other party’s representative . . .
only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means.”).
80. Eco Mfg. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2003 WL 1888988, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
2003) (recognizing a division among courts); see also In re Seagate, 497 F.3d
1360, 1372 (“In considering the scope of waiver resulting from the advice of
counsel defense, district courts have reached varying results with respect to
trial counsel.”).
81. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006) (“In a case where the copyright owner
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was
committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”).
83. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370.
84. See Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389 (stating that in patent
infringement cases, a potential infringer’s actual notice of another’s patent
rights creates “an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether
or not he is infringing”).
85. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright § 262 (2008) (citing Doehrer v. Caldwell,
1980 WL 1158, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 1980), disapproved of on other grounds, F.E.L.
Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1985)).
86. Willfulness in this context means that the defendant “recklessly
disregarded” the possibility that “its conduct represented infringement.”
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These cases have often found the following factors helpful in
determining whether a copyright violation is willful.
(1) “lack of intent to infringe;”87
(2) “a bona fide belief in noninfringement;”88
(3) “a substantial defense to the infringement charge;”89
(4) “failure of the defendant to seek advice of counsel.”90
Where infringement is found, a court may consider the
following factors when evaluating an award of statutory
damages:
(5) “defendant’s mitigating conduct towards the copyright
holder;”91
(6) “the extent of the infringing defendant’s contributions
to the project;”92
(7) “the fact that the project caused the infringer to lose
considerable sums of money.”93
E. SUMMARY
When Underwater Devices was decided, it was a difficult
period for patents and the enforcement of patents.94 The
somewhat less rigorous “due care” standard was most likely
intended by the Federal Circuit as a deterrent for would-be
patent infringers. This deterrent was likely necessary to
ensure the continued vitality of the patent system for
Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Fitzgerald Publ’g
Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1010 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[R]eckless
disregard of the copyright holder’s rights . . . suffices to warrant award of the
enhanced damages.”). A plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant
“‘had knowledge that its actions constitute[d] an infringement.’” Id. at 1010;
Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2001).
87. 18 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Lewis R. Clayton, ‘Seagate’s’ Objective Standard—’State of Mind’
Irrelevant,
238
N.Y.L.J.
3,
Sept.
6,
2007,
available
at
http://www.paulweiss.com/resources/pubs/detail.aspx?publication=1634
(“Underwater Devices was issued at a time when, the Federal Circuit later
said, ‘widespread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national
innovation incentive.’”) (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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protecting and fostering innovation. However, times have
changed, and the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is also
changing. For the first several years after the Federal Circuit
was created, the Supreme Court took few appeals, perhaps
because they felt the Federal Circuit was correctly interpreting
the law.95 Recently, the Supreme Court has taken more
appeals from the Federal Circuit and has reversed it several
times.96 Some speculate that perhaps the Court is unsettled
regarding the pro-patent Federal Circuit.97 The Federal Circuit
has responded by backing away slightly. As a result of
widespread disapproval98 of the due care standard of
willfulness, the standard walked right into the crosshairs of a
Federal Circuit that is attempting to moderate its pro-patent
position.
II. SEAGATE FIXES SOME ISSUES AND LEAVES SOME
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Faced with a patent litigation suit where the plaintiff was
charging willful infringement, Seagate Corporation utilized the
“opinion of counsel” defense in an attempt to show that its
infringement was based on a good faith belief that the patent at
issue was invalid.99 This tactic then raised the issue of waiver
of the defendant’s attorney-client privileges and attorney workproduct.100 Seagate voluntarily disclosed the opinion counsel’s
entire work-product and made the opinion counsel himself
available for a deposition.101 Plaintiff Convolve, Inc. sought to
compel, and the district court granted, discovery of much more,
including “any communications and work-product of Seagate’s
other counsel, including its trial counsel.”102 The district court
defined the scope of the waiver to extend to any communication
concerning the opinion for the time period between when
95. Tony Mauro, High Court Case Could Imperil Pending Patents, LEGAL
TIMES,
Nov.
28,
2006,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1164636899425 (noting that, until
recently, the Federal Circuit’s decisions were usually affirmed).
96. Id. (stating that, in the past four years, the Supreme Court has taken
nine Federal Circuit appeals and affirmed none).
97. Id.
98. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent
Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003).
99. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
100. Id. at 1369–70.
101. Id. at 1366.
102. Id. at 1366.
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Seagate first gained knowledge of the patents until the
infringement ceased. 103 Seagate, faced with potentially very
damaging disclosures of confidential communications,
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, which
the court granted.104
The court’s first item of business was to review the
standard announced in Underwater Devices that defined willful
infringement.105 The court’s reasoning for examining this issue
was that a change in the standard of willfulness might change
the relevancy of any documents sought by the plaintiff.106 The
court here indicated the need to review the willfulness
standard given the subtle interplay between willfulness, due
care, and the waiver rules.107 If the standard for willful
infringement were changed from a subjective standard to an
objective standard, the plaintiffs might not need to seek
privileged documents to make their case, as it would no longer
need evidence of the defendant’s state of mind.
The court did change the standard, and in the process
overruled Underwater Devices and the standard of “due care”
for determination of willful infringement.108 In place of “due
care”, the court stated that the true test is one of “objective
recklessness”: “Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.”109
Furthermore, the court said that this objectively defined risk
must have been “known or so obvious that it should have been
known to the accused infringer.”110 Thus Seagate established a
103. Id. at 1367.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1368–69.
106. Id. at 1371–72. (“While it is true that the issue of willful infringement,
or even infringement for that matter, has not been decided by the trial court, it
is indisputable that the proper legal standard for willful infringement informs
the relevance of evidence relating to that issue and, more importantly here,
the proper scope of discovery.”).
107. See id. at 1367 (reciting the questions for determination and listing as
No. 3: “Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard announced in
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., on the issue of waiver of
attorney-client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in
Underwater Devices and the duty of care standard itself?”) (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 1371.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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two-part test for finding willfulness.
The essential reasoning of the court was that precedent
has treated willfulness as the linchpin of a finding of treble
damages, and the definition of the word “willful” as applied to
patent law was different than the definition of “willful” as
applied to other areas of law.111 Therefore, patent law should be
“harmonized” with other areas of the law. The court cited Ebay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,112 for the proposition that the
Supreme Court approves of harmonizing copyright and patent
law.113 The court briefly reviewed copyright case law that uses
“reckless” as the standard for its definition of “willful.”114 The
Federal Circuit also analogized to other areas of the law to
support its conclusion that willful equals reckless. Specifically,
the Federal Circuit used a Supreme Court decision that
addressed the “meaning of willfulness as a statutory condition
of civil liability for punitive damages” under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.115 The Fair Credit Reporting Act had provisions
for assessment of increased damages based on a finding of
willfulness.116 In that case willfulness was defined as “reckless
disregard of the law.” 117 The court concluded that because
other areas of the law define willfulness as recklessness, patent
law should as well.118 The court left further development of the
standard open for later cases.119
With the affirmative duty of care standard in flames, the
court transitioned to the attorney-client privilege issue by
stressing that there is “no affirmative obligation to obtain
opinion of counsel,”120 and that the “state of mind of the
accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.”121
This set the stage for the discussion of the attorney-client

111. See id. at 1370–71.
112. Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
113. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370.
114. Id. (“Under the Copyright Act, a copyright owner can elect to receive
statutory damages, and trial courts have discretion to enhance the damages,
up to a statutory maximum, for willful infringement. Although the statute
does not define willful, it has consistently been defined as including reckless
behavior.”) (citation omitted).
115. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S.Ct. 2201 (2007)).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006).
117. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1371.
121. Id.
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privilege and attorney work-product immunity. Previously,
courts often invoked the relevancy of the state of mind of the
accused when granting broad discovery access to privileged
attorney-client communications and work-product.122
The court began by upholding the implied waiver rule,
reasoning that opinion counsel communications are relevant to
determining whether the objectively reckless risk was “known
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer” and represents the objective business decision
regarding whether or not infringement has occurred.123 This is
also based on the premise of fairness: if the defense is going to
use the advice of counsel defense, the other side must have
access to be able to test that defense.124
The court next addressed the trial counsel waiver by
holding that “the significantly different functions of trial
counsel and opinion counsel advise against extending waiver to
trial counsel.”125 The court contrasted the role of opinion
counsel with that of trial counsel, which has a significantly
different function and role: to prepare for adversarial
litigation.126 The need for access to the communications
between trial counsel and client is strongly counterbalanced by
the principles underlying the attorney-client and the attorney
work-product privileges.127
Furthermore, since the court found that most often trial
counsel are retained after filing suit, any probative value would
only be to post-filing conduct by the defendant.128 However, the
court further reasoned that since litigation had already begun,
122. See In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
123. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
124. Id. at 1372 (referring to the “sword and shield” theory of waiver
whereby the subject matter scope of the waiver “is grounded in principles of
fairness and serves to prevent a party from simultaneously using the privilege
as both a sword and a shield; that is, it prevents the inequitable result of a
party disclosing favorable communications while asserting the privilege as to
less favorable ones”).
125. Id. at 1373.
126. Id.
127. The court discusses Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), which is
really an attorney work-product case, and concludes that the same factors
supporting the application of the attorney work-product doctrine apply to the
attorney client privilege. Those factors are reduction of inefficiency,
unfairness, and sharp practices. Id. at 511.
128. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d at 1374.

MCCARTHY.WEB

2009]

2/20/2009 12:08:53 PM

IN RE SEAGATE

373

the patentee could apply for a preliminary injunction to prevent
ongoing infringement.129 If the preliminary injunction was
granted, the patentee’s rights were protected from future
infringement and there was no relevance to having trial
counsel’s privileged communications or work-product.130
Moreover, if the preliminary injunction was denied, it was
likely because the plaintiff could not meet its burden of
showing a substantial likelihood of success at trial, probably
because the defendant had shown a substantial question as to
invalidity.131 The court reasoned that the plaintiff was unlikely
to be able to meet the new, more stringent, objective
reasonableness standard in such a case (again making trial
counsel communications and work-product useless).132 The
court strongly hinted that in a case where a patentee sues an
alleged infringer and pleads willful infringement but does not
move for a preliminary injunction, the patentee “should not be
allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely on the
infringer’s post-filing conduct.”133 Implicit in this reasoning is
that a patent holder should not be able to sleep on his or her
rights (to obtain a preliminary injunction) and then drag a
defendant to court for what could be a very long and drawn-out
trial while the meter is running on the damages.134 The court
left open for future consideration a case in which the
preliminary injunction is denied on grounds other than the
likelihood of success on the merits.135
The majority opinion continued by holding that the advice
of counsel waiver does not extend to the work-product of trial
counsel.136 The court found the same rationales for the
existence of the attorney work-product that the Supreme Court
articulated in Hickman apply with equal force to patent
cases.137 The court did not alter the standard rule that “a party
may obtain discovery of work product [by showing] need and
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id. In infringement cases, invalidity is one of the relevant factors a
court uses to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction. See
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
132. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d at 1374.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1374.
136. Id. at 1375.
137. Id. at 1376.
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hardship.”138
Finally, the court granted Seagate’s mandamus and
ordered the district court to “reconsider its discovery orders.”139
This completely overhauled not only the willfulness standard,
but also the scope of the attorney work-product and attorneyclient privilege doctrine.
III. CRITICISM AND THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF
WILFULLNESS LITIGATION
A. THE USE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS A COROLLARY IN
WILLFULNESS INFRINGEMENT.
The majority opinion borrows case law regarding copyright
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).140 Copyright opinions
define the term “willfully” as used in the statute to mean
“reckless” behavior.141 Thus the Seagate majority “harmonized”
willfulness between patent law and copyright law.
The
majority further supported this use of copyright law with a
citation to Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,142 in which the
Supreme Court majority opinion “not[ed] with approval that its
resolution of the permanent injunction standard in the patent
context created harmony with copyright law.”143 In contrast to
copyright law, the patent statutes on damages do not mention
the word “willfully” at all.
Judge Gajarsa’s Seagate
concurrence, joined by Judge Newman, asserted that the court
should not read “willfully” into the statute at all. Thus a
comparison with copyright law, which specifically includes the
The
term “willful” in the statute, is inappropriate.144

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The statute provides that a copyright owner, in lieu of actual damages
may recover an award of statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000. 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). It also provides that where the copyright owner proves that
the infringement was “committed willfully,” the court can increase the award
to a maximum of $150,000. Id. § 504(c)(2).
141. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir.
2001) (“Willfulness . . . means that the defendant ‘recklessly disregarded’ the
possibility that ‘its conduct represented infringement.’”) (quoting Hamil
America, Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 1999)).
142. Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (cited in
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370).
143. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370, quoting id.
144. Id at 1378–79 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
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concurring opinion aimed to make the finding of “willfulness” a
sufficient but not necessary element of awarding triple
damages.145 The concurring justices would allow a judge
control and wide discretion in awarding of punitive damages.
The problem with the concurring opinion’s argument is
that it uses a case, General Motors Corporation v. Devex
Corporation,146 that refused to graft existing common law onto
an after-arising statute regarding interest awarded for
prevailing plaintiffs in patent infringement suits.147 Prior to
1946, the Patent Act contained no specific interest provision for
prevailing plaintiffs in patent litigation; nonetheless, the court
applied a common law standard that when a party had acted in
bad faith, the opposing party was entitled to interest.148 When
the Patent Act was modified by Congress to specifically include
interest in 1946, the awarding of interest was allocated to the
discretion of the court.149 The General Motors court held that
no bad faith standard should be read into the statute, thus
giving the court broader discretion to award interest.150 The
Seagate concurrence reasoned that “[w]hen Congress wishe[s]
to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringement action,
it [will say] so explicitly.”151 The problem with this opinion is
that it ignores other Supreme Court precedent that explicitly
integrates requirements not originally present in the statutes
into the statutes themselves based on other similar statutes. A
good example is the watershed copyright case of Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., in which the Supreme
Court upheld the legality of the video cassette recorder.152 In
doing so, it imported the Patent Act’s staple article of commerce
provision into copyright law.153 This provision exempts from
the domain of contributory infringement any device that has a
substantial non-infringing use.154 The Court found that the
145. Id.
146. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) (refusing to
incorporate the common law standard that in the absence of bad faith on the
part of the defendant, interest did not accrue on unliquidated damages).
147. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Gajarsa, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1379–80.
149. Id. at 1380.
150. See Gen. Motors, 461 U.S. at 653–54.
151. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1380 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
152. 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
153. Id. at 442.
154. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the
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VCR had a substantial non-infringing use as a device that
facilitated “time shifting.”155
Furthermore, any argument against harmonization ignores
other cases that have interpreted patent and copyright law
similarly. For example, copyright law has provisions for
awarding attorney’s fees for prevailing parties at the discretion
of the court.156 A split developed in the circuit courts over the
standard a plaintiff must meet, as opposed to the standard a
defendant must meet, to be entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees if that party prevails at trial.157 One line of cases held that
a defendant was allowed attorney’s fees if it could prove that
the suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith, while the
plaintiff was allowed attorney’s fees as a matter of course.158
The other line of cases applied the same standard to both the
plaintiff and defendant winners.159 The Supreme Court, in
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,160 resolved this split by holding that
the standard should be the same for plaintiffs and
defendants.161 The court, in a footnote, compared its holding to
the patent statute, which contained more specific language that
was interpreted to be undifferentiated as to the party claiming
the attorney’s fees.162
These examples indicate that the Supreme Court will
apply analogous rules when policy so requires. The Court in
Sony and Fogerty and the Federal Circuit in Seagate implicitly
United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.”) (emphasis added).
155. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984). “Time shifting” is the process of recording a live television broadcast
and watching it later. Id at 421.
156. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). (“In any civil action under this title, the court
in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party
other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise
provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to
the prevailing party as part of the costs.”).
157. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 520–21 (1994).
158. See id. at 520–21.
159. See id. at 521.
160. Id. at 517.
161. Id. at 534.
162. Id. at 525 n.12.
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recognized that at some points in time—particularly the
remedy phase of an infringement action—the policies of the
copyright and patent statutes are implicitly the same or very
similar. The idea of both areas of law is to compensate the
injured party and deter egregious conduct. Thus, applying
principles of patent law to copyright law and vice versa is not
unjustifiable, even if the court were to add restrictions on
statutory language that is not explicit in the statute.
The Seagate concurrence provided examples to support its
reasoning that the awarding of triple damages should not be
confined to simply cases about willfulness.163 One of these
examples involved a case where the patentee could not prove
the amount of damages suffered at the hands of an infringer.164
Thus in that case it would be difficult to adequately
compensate the injured plaintiff and triple damages might be
appropriate despite a lack of willfulness.
Indeed if the
principles above regarding the merger of patent and copyright
laws at the point of remedy are to be followed, one would point
out that the copyright law has a statutory provision awarding
statutory damages at the election of the copyright holder.165
Thus one might argue that a reading of the Patent Act that
would incorporate some element of discretion to the trial court
beyond a finding of willfulness in awarding increased damages
might be a necessary corollary. In many ways the concerns the
Seagate concurrence used to support the theory that increased
damages can be awarded for circumstances outside of
willfulness can be ameliorated without upsetting the holding of
Seagate. In those cases, one might read something into the
patent law—namely that since copyright law recognizes other
situations in which these increased damages might be
appropriate, patent law might as well.
163. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“I believe we should adhere to the plain meaning of
the statute and leave the discretion to enhance damages in the capable hands
of the district courts.”).
164. Id. at 1378 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (“For example, assume that a
substantial portion of a defendant’s sales data is inadvertently but
irretrievably lost prior to discovery.”).
165. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect, at any time
before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and
profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the
action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and
severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $ 30,000 as the court
considers just.”).
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B. FUTURE DIRECTION AND RAMIFICATIONS
1. What factors will be relevant to courts in assessing whether
an infringement was willful?
The Seagate court held that to establish willful
infringement, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high
likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent.”166 The court stressed that “[t]he state of mind of the
accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.”167
The court chose not to provide additional guidance for finding
willfulness168 but did suggest in a footnote that courts might
apply “the standards of commerce.”169 The “standards of
commerce” is not a term of art, so this clarification added little
other than to perhaps point a court to look at commercial policy
implications when determining which factors to consider.
After Seagate, litigants can likely still present evidence of
an intentional copying by the defendant to prove that the
defendant “willfully” copied the patented invention. But, in the
absence of such evidence, the plaintiff will likely try to show
that the defendant’s actions after learning of the plaintiff’s
patent were objectively unreasonable. Where the plaintiff does
not possess direct evidence of willfulness, it may nevertheless
present sufficient circumstantial evidence of willfulness to
cause a court to infer willfulness when the rigorous “objectively
unreasonable” standard is applied. The question becomes:
What factors should a court examine to determine whether the
defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable?170
One way a plaintiff will attack a defendant’s actions is to
show that the defendant’s reading of the plaintiff’s patent was
objectively unreasonable.
There are two related factors,
already laid out by the Federal Circuit prior to Seagate, used to
determine willful infringement that remain relevant: closeness
of the case and defendant’s size and financial condition.
If a court believes the infringement violation was a close
call, the closeness would tend to show that the actions of the
166. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
167. Id.
168. Id. (“We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of
this standard.”).
169. Id. at 1371 n.5.
170. I.e., What types of evidence will tend to indicate willfulness?
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defendant infringer were not objectively reckless. Indeed, the
Seagate court hinted that this would be an important factor in
determining willful infringement.171 The Seagate court stated
that to avoid a preliminary injunction a defendant must show
“a substantial question as to invalidity,” and thus if the court
denies a preliminary injunction, the defendant’s actions would
not likely be objectively reckless.172
The use of this factor also comports with copyright law’s
use of a similar factor, “a substantial defense to infringement,”
in determining objective recklessness.173 Other areas of the law
are in accord; for example, the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of objective recklessness in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Burr.174 In Safeco, the Court discussed the Fair Credit
Reporting Act’s (FCRA) requirement that if any adverse action
is taken against a consumer on the basis of his credit report,
the consumer must be notified of the action.175 Any willful
violation results in civil liability.176 The Court in Safeco
concluded that a “reckless” disregard of the notice requirement
met the “willful” standard.177 As part of its analysis, the Court
found that one of the defendants, Safeco, violated the notice
provision but not willfully. It concluded that Safeco’s reading of
the statute was a reasonable one and thus not objectively
reckless.178 Note that this factor is entirely objective and does
not include any elements of what the defendant actually
believed. Thus if the defendant actually believed that he had a
good defense, but its defense was objectively unreasonable,
then this factor has not been met.
Additionally, we might expect more sophisticated parties
such as a large corporation or an inventor with particular
171. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d at 1374 (Plaintiffs unable to
meet probability of success factor in preliminary injunction standard unlikely
to win willfulness argument). If the case is a close one, probability of success
should be lower and thus it should be less likely that willfulness will be
shown.
172. Id. (“Similarly, if a patentee attempts to secure injunctive relief but
fails, it is likely the infringement did not rise to the level of recklessness.”).
173. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2nd Cir. 2001).
174. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208–10 (2007).
175. See id. passim; 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2006).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006).
177. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209.
178. Id. at 2216 n.20 (“Where, as here, the statutory text and relevant
court and agency guidance allow for more than one reasonable interpretation,
it would defy history and current thinking to treat a defendant who merely
adopts one such interpretation as a knowing or reckless violator.”).
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knowledge of the patent system to be more diligent in avoiding
infringement. This factor would support the second part of the
court’s new test: whether the infringing party knew or should
have known of the objectively high risk that it was
infringing.179 Thus, a small start-up company perhaps cannot
reasonably be required to spend up to $100,000 for an
infringement opinion. However, larger companies with more
resources and internal patent law departments perhaps might
be reasonably expected to expend larger amounts on avoidance
of infringement. Several copyright cases also support this
principle.180
Another broader set of factors that might be applicable to a
patent infringement action could be loosely categorized as
“remedial factors.” These factors would establish that the
defendant attempted to remedy the infringement once it
learned of the plaintiff’s patents. One important consideration
from a policy perspective in this category would be a serious
attempt at designing around a patent. Some copyright cases
hold that a serious attempt at differentiation of the accused
product and the copyrighted work can support a finding that
there exists no willful infringement.181 This factor clearly is
supported by the overall goals of the patent system.182 A
primary purpose of the patent system is to disseminate

179. See In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
180. Compare Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D.
Mont. 1990) (finding no willfulness when an unsophisticated restaurant owner
went to the library and researched a home use exemption to copyright law but
was ultimately wrong in his conclusion), with Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol
Publ’g Group, 955 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that a copyright infringement in which the book’s author was
an attorney and the publisher was familiar with copyright law supported
willfulness finding).
181. Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800 (4th Cir.
2001) (finding that an attempt to differentiate a product from a copyrighted
product was evidence that the infringement was not willful).
182. “According to the Federal Circuit, the ability to design around an
existing patent is a benefit of a patent system that ensures a ‘steady flow of
innovations to the marketplace.’”
Joshua Stowell, Comment, Willful
Infringement and the Evidentiary Value of Opinion Letters after Knorr-Bremse
v. Dana, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15 (2005) available at
(citing
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0005.pdf
and quoting William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and
Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful
Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 419 (citing Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control
USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
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knowledge of new inventions and to facilitate the invention of
derivative works, as well as to spur the marketplace to find a
new and better way of accomplishing the same task. This
includes finding ways around the patent’s limits and
protections. Patent law should encourage inventors to make a
good faith effort to design around a patent because it promotes
more inventive behavior by allowing competition.
What
constitutes a sufficient design around, however, is uncertain
prior to a court ruling.183 Thus, any good faith effort at design
around should be allowed as a defense to willful infringement.
There might be other, unlisted considerations that would fall
under this broad “remedial” category as well. For example,
where the defendant halted all infringing activities upon
learning of the patent. Indeed many of these factors find
support in pre-Seagate decisions.184
When faced with accusations of infringement, a potential
defendant must make a choice as to whether to continue the
infringing activity, stop the infringement activity, modify its
conduct so as not to infringe, or take other actions to deal with
the situation. Seagate and the factors identified above that
would be relevant to the determination of willfulness suggest
that courts should simply look at how this process of decision
making was carried out in order to determine willfulness
instead of focusing so much on the patent opinion. Courts
could look to corporate law and adopt a simpler framework that
requires two factors: sufficient gathering of information given
the circumstances and sufficient evidence of adequate
deliberation. A valid patent opinion would become simply one
means for satisfying the information requirement. These
requirements would be flexible based on the circumstances
such as the size and financial condition of the company, the
time in which the decision must be made, and other factors that
would normally be expected to affect an informed decision.
This approach is likely to comport with the court’s
endorsement of factors of commercial fairness that it suggested
would be relevant.185 This test would use the recklessness

183. See infra note 191 for discussion of a case in which infringement of the
patent hinged upon the meaning of one word.
184. See Stowell, supra note 182 (collecting cases that refused to find
willfulness upon a showing that the defendant, in good faith, attempted to
design around the patent or abandoned the infringing activity upon getting
notice of the existence of the patent).
185. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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standard. Consideration of the two factors provided above
would reflect a true understanding of the nature of the
business and patent world as many of the litigants are
companies and entrepreneurs who are not skilled patent
attorneys. They are making decisions in real time, often with
inadequate information, that have potentially grave
consequences for their companies.186 The approach reflects the
fiduciary duty of care that directors are held to with regard to
corporate transactions. Directors can be held personally liable
for decisions that lack any rational basis187 or are otherwise
unreasonable.188 These directors are further insulated by the
business judgment rule, which presumes that corporate
Indeed, this corporate doctrine
activities are proper.189
comports with the partnership statutes in many states that
hold partners liable only for gross negligence.190
The idea behind both the business judgment rule and the
process framework is that courts need to recognize that being
successful in business and the progress of technology entails
taking risks often based on inadequate information.191
186. See supra note 8.
187. See Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that a
business decision that lacks a rational basis can give rise to personal liability
on the part of the directors).
188. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that a
failure of adequate process can result in personal liability of a director); see
also MINN. STAT. §302A.251(1) (2008).
189. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
190. See e.g., MINN. STAT. §323A.0404(c) (2008) (“A partner’s duty of care to
the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding up of the
partnership business is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation
of the law.”).
191. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 778–79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968);
see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 general cmt. (West 2007) (“Retention of
[the business judgment rule] is essential as an incentive to directors to take
corporate risks that may lead to corporate profits . . . .”). In the patent world,
a business simply cannot predict how a court is likely to rule regarding the
scope of their claims or their competitor’s claims until litigation. Despite this
high uncertainty, decisions in this field can have tremendous consequences for
companies. This would not be unusual for litigation in general; however for
patents the issue is more profound as patent cases turn on the interpretation
often of one word. For example, “the interpretation of the word ‘reference’ in
the phrase ‘reference means’ was a $51 million issue in a recent case.”
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 12, at 804 (citing Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v.
BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D.
Colo. 2006), aff’d 222 F. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Allowing firms some room for error increases the likelihood
that firms will want to explore new technological areas and
take innovative risks.
While not an exhaustive list of the factors likely relevant in
a court’s willfulness determination, these factors would likely
be important to any such determination. To summarize, based
on current copyright law and other sources of law, courts likely
will consider the following factors (among other possible
factors) in making a finding of willfulness based on objectively
reckless behavior: 1) the closeness of the case and the
defendant’s good faith belief of non-infringement; 2) the
defendant’s level of sophistication, including size and financial
condition; 3) the defendant’s serious attempts at designing
around a patent or mitigating infringing conduct; and courts
might consider 4) the defendant’s internal processes when
confronted with infringement claims. One interesting point to
note is that all of these factors are somewhat interrelated. For
example, closeness of the case, reasonable defense, and process
factors might be applied slightly differently depending on the
sophistication of the parties and so forth.
2. Effect of Seagate
One of the biggest complaints with the “due care” standard
was that the Federal Circuit often over scrutinized the opinions
of counsel.192 If the opinion was not technically correct in the
slightest of details, the Federal Circuit figured that it was
unreasonable to rely on that opinion and would find willfulness
despite a contrary interpretation by the opinion counsel.193 The
Federal Circuit essentially treated business leaders as patent
experts as a result of its dissection of counsel’s opinions being
very thorough. This, coupled with the charge of opinion
shopping if companies obtained multiple opinions, put business
leaders in a precarious situation. They essentially had one shot
to find a very good patent attorney. This focus on the opinion
also led courts to approve attorney-client privilege waivers for
opinions relied upon. Often courts extended these waivers to
trial counsel as well.
With the advent of the new “objective recklessness”
standard, the Federal Circuit and courts likely will back away
from their opinion nitpicking, for the new standard is not only
192. See, e.g., Y’Barbo, supra note 62, at 67.
193. Id.
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an objective standard but a more stringent “reckless” standard
instead of simple negligence. An opinion rendered by a trained
patent professional that clears the defendant of infringing
would likely allow a potential infringer to escape triple
damages. However, there might be some cases in which the
patent opinion is so egregious and the company sophisticated
enough in patent law such that the company should have
known not to rely on that particular patent opinion. This
would all be analyzed under the factors regarding the business
decision making process as well as the sophistication of the
parties.
Furthermore, as this standard is more difficult for
plaintiffs to meet, it would be expected that the amount of
summary judgment rulings early in the patent litigation
process would increase to dispose of the willful infringement
counts.194
Finally with the ruling on attorney-client privilege waiver
not extending to trial counsel, the whole thrust of Seagate’s
motivation to seek the mandamus in the first place, this
Comment would expect that companies would continue to seek
independent trial and opinion counsel to make sure they can
maintain trial counsel attorney-client privilege.195
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Seagate overturned a previous decision in
Underwater Devices that had established an affirmative duty of
care for potential infringers to avoid a finding of willfulness
and triple damages.196 The court used interpretations of what
the word “willful” means in copyright and other statutes to
conclude that to establish a willful violation of the statute
requires a showing of objective recklessness.197 This means
that “to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions

194. See Boyd, supra note 9.
195. See WILLIAM M. ATKINSON, ALSTON & BIRD, L.L.P., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ADVISORY: WILLFULNESS REDEFINED: IN RE SEAGATE (Aug. 30,
2007), http://www.alston.com (follow “Resources: Advisories” hyperlink; then
follow article title hyperlink).
196. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
197. See id.
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constituted infringement . . . .”198
In doing so, the court did not address what factors, if any,
would be important to courts in determining whether a
defendant had acted in an objectively reckless manner.199
Despite this, there are two good sources for finding guideposts
for future decisions. First, look at which factors were used in
the past that are still consistent with the new objective
recklessness standard. Second, look at some of the factors of
willfulness that copyright and other analogous areas of law
have developed.
Applying this process, this Comment has shown several
factors likely to be important. They include: 1) closeness of the
case, 2) defendant’s size and financial condition, 3) failures of
the potential infringer to follow objectively reasonable
processes in evaluating claims of patentees, and 4) remedial
efforts upon learning of the patent at issue, such as a product
redesign. While these factors are not the only factors a court is
likely to consider, they are a start at attempting to articulate a
court’s methodology. The benefit of having these as a starting
point is to allow companies and other interested parties to have
some idea of how to structure their conduct. These factors and
the court’s hint at commercial standards could suggest a
framework shift that focuses on adequacy in the defendant’s
decision making process and not the final decision itself.
Finally, Seagate is likely to help companies faced with
patent litigation suits maintain their attorney client privilege
with their trial counsel.200 To take advantage of this ruling,
companies will likely rely even more heavily on separate
opinion and trial counsel. Also, while an opinion will still be
very important, as it is the best way for a defendant to show
lack of objective recklessness, the opinion a defendant obtains
will be less likely to be picked apart by the court in the
willfulness phase and more likely to be a bullet-proof shield
that the company may use to defend against a willfulness
finding.

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1373.

